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IN THE SUPREME COURT

OF THE STATE OF UTAH

MACKAY & KNOBEL ENTERPRISES,
INC., a Utah Corporation,
Plaintiff,

vs.
TETON VAN GAS, INC., a Corporation,

Case No.
11,555

VAN GAS, a Corporation,
Defendants.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Suit for fire damages resulting from negligent installation of butane storage tank.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
District Court dismissed complaint because corporate
charter was suspended after suit was filed although
charter was reinstated before denial of motion for new
trial or to amend order of dismissal.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff seeks an order vacating the order dismissing
its complaint and permitting the case to proceed to trial.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
This action was filed to recover damages for the
destruction of Plaintiff's service station building and
equipment resulting from improper installation of butane
tank without automatic or manual shut-off valves. A
minor fire resulted in complete destruction of Plaintiff's
property because the building was saturated with butane
gas which could not be shut off. (R. 1-4). Plaintiff's corporate charter was suspended six months after the
complaint was filed by reason of non-payment of Utah
Franchise Taxes. (R. 10, 26) but was reinstated before
denial of plaintiff's motion to correct judgment or for a
new trial. Defendant's motion to dismiss by reason of said
suspension was granted by Judge Faux.
Plaintiff's new counsel filed a motion to amend or
correct the order or for a new trial. Judge Faux denied
the motion, concluding that repeal of 16-1-2, UCA, 1953,
and adoption of 16-10-100 and 16-10-101, UCA, 1953, as
a part of the Utah Business Corporation Act without
amending 59-13-61, UCA, 1953, concerning suspension
of corporate charters for non-payment of corporation
franchise taxes, left plaintiff without power to sue in
connection with the winding up of its affairs (R. 67, 68).

ARGUMENT
POINT I
SUSPENSION OF CORPORATE CHARTER FOR NON·
PAYMENT OF FRANCHISE TAXES DOES NOT AF·
FECT ITS RIGHT TO SUE IN CONNECTION WITH
WINDING UP OF ITS AFFAIRS.
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The sole issue in this case it whether a corporation may
bring a lawsuit to wind up its affairs after its corporate
charter has been suspended.
(a) Rights of "suspended" corporation under prior
law. 59-13-61, UCA, 1953, reads in part as follows:

"If a tax computed and levied hereunder is not paid
... the corporate powers, rights and privileges of the
delinquent taxpayer, if it is a domestic corporation,
shall be suspended ... " (Emphasis added)

16-1-2, UCA, 1953, of the act as it existed prior to its
repeal when the Utah Business Corporation Act was
adopted read in part as follows:
"Any corporation organized under the laws of . . .
Utah whose franchise ... may ... expire by ... forfeiture, or by dissolution by decree of court may
nevertheless continue for the purpose of winding uµ
its affairs; and to effect this purpose may ... sue
and be sued, contract, and exercise all other incidental and necessary powers. (emphasis added)
A long line of Utah case establish the rule that a corporation whose charter has been "suspended" as provided in 59-13-61, UCA, 1953, or "forfeited" as provided
in the prior statute could engage in limited business activities to wind up its affairs and could sue and be sued in
connection therewith. Some of those cases are as follows:
(1) In Houston v. Utah Lake Land, Water & Power

Co., 55 U. 393, 187 P. 174 (1919) the Court acknowledge
the right of a corporation whose charter had been "forfeited" under prior law wind up its affairs, but did not
authorize it to engage in new business.
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(2) In Consolidated Mills & Feed Yards Co. v. Patter.
son, 62 U. 506, 221 P. 159 (1923) corporate officers were
held personally liable for new debts incurred by corporation after its charter had been "forfeited" for nonpayment of taxes.
(3) In Henroid v. East Tintic Development Co., 52
U. 245, 173 P. 134, (1918), the Court held that the statute
contemplated that the board should wind up the corporate affairs in a case where the corporate charter and
right to conduct business were "forfeited."
( 4) In Warren v. Dixon Ranch Co., 123 U. 416, 260 P.
2d 741, the Court held that service on director of a cor·
poration whose charter had been "suspended" gave jurisdiction over the corporation, though the director had
never been authorized by charter, by-laws or court appointment to act as agent for the stockholders.

1

i
1

(b) Judge Faux has ruled that "suspended" corporation has no right to sue to assist in winding up its
affairs.

Judge Faux has held that the right of a corporation to
sue in connection with winding up of its affairs no longer
exists by reason of the repeal of 16-1-2, UCA, 1953, in
connection with adoption of the Utah Business Corpor·
ation Act. That act has provisions which are similar to
the old 16-1-2, UCA, 1953, but which do not specifically
deal with "suspended" corporations, and which read in
part as follows:
( c) Rights of "dissolved" corporation under present

law.
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16-10-100. SURVIVAL OF REMEDY AFTER DISSOLUTION.

"The dissolution of a corporation either ( 1) by the
issuance of a certificate of dissolution by the Secretary of State, or (2) by a decree of court when the
court has not liquidated the assets and business of
the corporation as provided in this act, or (3) by expiration of its period of duration, shall not take away
or impair any remedy available to or against the
corporation ,its directors, officers, or shareholders,
for any right or claim existing, or any liability incurred, prior to such dissolution if action or other
proceedings thereon is commenced within two years
after the date of such dissolution. Any such action or
proceeding by or against the corporation may be
prosecuted or def ended by the corporation in its corporate name ... " (Emphasis added)
16-10-101. SURVIVAL OF CORPORATE ENTITY
AFTER DISSOLUTION. "Notwithstanding the dissolution of a corporation either (1) by the issuance of
a certificate of dissolution by the Secretary of State,
or (2) by a decree of court, or (3) by expiration of
its period of duration, the corporate existence of such
corporation shall nevertheless continue for the purpose of winding up its affairs in respect to any property and assets which have not been distributed or
otherwise disposed of prior to such dissolution, and
to effect such purpose such corporation may sell or
otherwise dispose of such property, sue and be sued,
contract and exercise all other incidental and necessary powers." (Emphasis added)
It is clear that if an actual dissolution of the corporation
has occurred the corporation could sue on a claim that
arose prior to dissolution. Falcanaero Enterprise, Inc. v.
Valley Investment Co., 16 U, 2d 77, 395 P.2d 915 (1964).
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The new statutes, however, fail to deal directly with the
status of a corporation whose charter has been "suspended" for non-payment of corporate franchise tax.

(d) Status of "suspended" corporation under present '

law.

Rule 65B(b) (1), URCP, authorizes suit against a corporation whose charter has been "suspended," and thereby recognizes that such a corporation has power to '
defend a lawsuit. It would seem that if a corporation has
power to defend a lawsuit that it also has the power to
file a counterclaim and/or the power to commence a lawsuit for purposes of winding up its affairs. The public
policy announced by 16-10-100 and 16-10-101, UCA, 1953, ,
quoted above, appears to be that corporate existence
should continue for purposes of effecting an orderly
winding up of the affairs of the corporation, disposition
of claims and lawsuit, etc. even though the very existence
of the corporation has been terminated. Some other
courts that have dealt with similar problems have concluded that a corporation whose charter has been "suspended" can still sue to wind up its affairs:
( 1) In Montana Valley Land Co. v. Bestul, 253 P. 2d
325 (Montana), the Court held that a corporation whose
charter has been suspended for nonpayment of taxes is
not completely dead but has sufficient life to be a
repository for title to real estate, and may sue or defend,
if, under statute, it is entitled to reinstatement at any
time and hence is not dissolved. (In our case the cor·
porate charter has in fact been reinstated).
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(2) In Carpenter & Carpenter v. Kingham (Wyoming),
109 P. 2d 463, 110 P. 2d 824, the Court held that a corporation could bring an action, after its dissolution by a
proclamation of the governor by reason of failure to pay
annual tax provided by law, in its corporate name for
the use of persons entitled to receive the proceeds of such
action.
(3) In Pacific Northwest Bell Tel. Co. v. Rivers
(Idaho), 398 P. 2d 63, the Court held that a corporation
does not die by becoming delinquent for failure to pay
annual tax as does natural person or corporation whose
term of existence has terminated, but is rather in a state
of suspended animation from which condition it can be
relieved by paying statutory penalties.
(4) California law expressly prohibits a corporation
whose charter has been suspended for failure to pay corporation tax, however even under those circumstances
the court has permitted reinstatement of the charter
while a suit was pending and has permitted the matter
to proceed to trial. Pac. Atlantic Wine v. Duccini, 245
P. 2d 622, 111 C.A.2d 957; Maryland Casualty Co. v.
Superior Ct., 91 Cal. App. 356, 267 P. 169.
(5) In Eagle Oil Corp. v. Cohassett Oil Corp., 263
Mich. 371, 248 NW 840 the Court held that the lower court
properly allowed the corporation which was in default
for failure to pay its privilege tax at the time of the hear-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

8

ing of the case to cure such default by payment of the
required fee.
(6) See also annotation at 6 ALR 3d 341, Sec. 8.
The intention of the legislature appears to have been
to continue existing procedures and rights so far as
practicable in adopting the Utah Business Corporation
Act, as indicated by 16-10-143, UCA, 1953, which reads
in part as follows:
"The repeal of a prior law by this act shall not affect
any right accrued or established, or any liability incurred, or any action or proceeding begun under the
provisions of such law prior to the repeal thereof
... " (Emphasis added)
The right of a corporation whose charter had been
"suspended" to bring legal action to wind up its affairs
was a right that had been "established" prior to the enactment of the Utah Business Corporation Act, and since
that act does not expressly prohibit a corporation whose
charter has been "suspended" from using the courts to
wind up its affairs, it is reasonable to conclude that the
legislature intended that the existing and "established"
procedure and "right" to use the courts in winding up its
affairs would be continued. The Model Business Corporation after which the Utah Act was patterned simply did
not make provision for the conduct of the affairs of a
corporation whose charter has been "suspended" for nonpayment of taxes. Where the legislature has failed to provide a procedure for disposition of the corporate assets
and the winding up of the corporate affairs in case of a
"suspension" the Court is free to follow judicial precedent
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and to use established procedures in winding up the affairs of such a corporation.
If the current law were to be construed as counsel for
Defendant and Judge Faux have construed it, if a corporation merely fails to pay its franchise tax its charter
may be "suspended." If the delinquency continues for a
longer period the more severe penalty of involuntary
dissolution in an action filed by the Attorney General
may be imposed, as provided in 16-10-89, UCA, 1953,
which reads in part as follows:

"A corporation may be dissolved involuntarily by a
decree of the district court in an action filed by the
Attorney General when it is established that:
(a) ... its corporate powers, rights and privileges
have been suspended as provided in 59-13-61;
"
(Emphasis added)
Even after the more severe penalty of dissolution has
been imposed as the result of a long continued delinquency in payment of tax, the corporation still has power
under 16-10-100 and 16-10-101, UCA, 1953, (quoted
above) to sue and to do other limited acts in connection
with the winding up of its affairs. It is unreasonable to
conclude that the legislature intended that a corporation
whose charter has merely been "suspended" but has not
had the more severe penalty of involuntary dissolution
imposed upon it would have less power to wind up its
affairs than a corporation whose very existence had been
terminated by involuntary dissolution.
(e) Public policy requires orderly winding up of the
affairs of a "suspended" corporation.
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Public policy in preserving the rights of creditors stockholders, and other persons interested in or whose rights
are affected by the "suspended" corporation requires that
the affairs and assets of that corporation be wound up in
an orderly fashion. If such a corporation has no power
to sue, it probably has no other power to sell or otherwise
assemble and dispose of its assets or affairs. The result
of such a situation would be complete chaos and would
probably reult in a windfall and wrongful appropriation
of corporate assets by persons not otherwise entitled
thereto. In our situation such a rule will confer upon the
Defendants immunity for their wrongful acts and will
deny to Plaintiff, its creditors and stockholders the right
to recover their one remaining valuable asset, to-wit, a
claim against the Defendants for destruction of the corporate assets and property.

1

The protection of revenue to the State of Utah does not
require such extreme measures. Merely terminating of
the right of the corporation to enter into new business
transactions appears to have been the intent of 59-13-61
and 59-13-62, UCA, 1953.

The policy of the law is to determine lawsuits on their
merits and not a mere technicality such as the nonpayment of a tax revenue to the State of Utah. See •
Kirkham v. Spencer, 3 U. 2d 399, 285 P. 2d 127. Rule 1,
URCP. 19 Am Jur 2d 1009, Sec. 1662, etc. Under 78-12-40,
UCA, 1953, Plaintiff is entitled to commence a new lawsuit against Defendants on the same facts since the failure
of this lawsuit is not on the merits, which statute reads in
part as follows:
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"If any action is commenced within due time and ...
the Plaintiff fails in such action . . . otherwise than
upon the merits, and the time limited by law ... for
commencing the same shall have expired, the Plaintiff .. . may commence a new action within one year
after the reversal or failure." (Emphasis added)
To permit the dismissal of this action on a technicality
only to refile as provided in the above statute, is a useless act, particularly where (as in our case) the technicality has been remedied by reinstatement of the corporate charter and payment of taxes and penalties prior
to denial of Plaintiff's motions.
(f) Duties of directors of "suspended" corporation.

In Consolidated Mills & Feed Yards Co. v. Patterson,
(1923), 62 U. 506, 221 P. 159 the Court stated:
"where a corporation's charter is forfeited in this
state, it is the duty of the directors, who are trustees
for the stockholders and creditors, to assemble its
assets, liquidate its indebtedness, and generally conduct its affairs in such manner as will properly expedite the winding up of the corporation's business."
The directors still have those same duties under the
current law but must have access to the court to properly
carry out their duties.
SUMMARY
Repeal of 16-1-2, UCA, 1953, which dealt with the
power of a corporation whose charter had been "forfeited" to wind up its affairs but makes no mention of a
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"suspended" charter and adoption of 16-10-100 and 1610-101, UCA, 1953, as a part of the Utah Business Corporation Act which provides for suits by and winding up
affairs of "dissolved" corporations and which also makes
no mention of the right of a corporation whose charter
has been "suspended" to wind up its affairs does not
prohibit Plaintiff whose charter was "suspended" after
the suit was started from continuing this lawsuit filed in
connection with the winding up of its affairs, particularly
where the charter was in fact reinstated prior to denial
by Judge Faux of motion to correct judgment and for a
new trial.
Public policy requires that the rights of creditors,
stockholders and others in a corporation whose charter
is "suspended" be protected from wrongful appropriation,
and that the affairs of such a corporation be liquidated
and wound up in an orderly fashion, rather than by a
scrambling for possession based upon a technicality. Defendant should not be permitted to reap a windfall and
to escape responsibility for its misconduct which
destroyed substantially all of the assets of the Plaintiff
because of poor draftsmanship by the legislature or a
technicality.
The pending lawsuit should be permitted to go to trial
on the merits.
Respectfully submitted,
RONALD C. BARKER
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant
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